SB 1070 and the 2012 ABA brief in Arizona v. United States

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Key Facts

Federal level: The Supreme Court held that federal law preempted Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of Arizona’s S.B. 1070.
Federal level: The Court held it was improper to enjoin S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) before state courts had a chance to construe the provision and without a showing of conflict with federal immigration law and its objectives.
State level: Arizona signed S.B. 1070 on April 23, 2010, enacting it as Laws 2010, Chapter 113, with changes made by HB 2162.
State level: A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) required a reasonable attempt to determine immigration status in certain lawful stops, detentions, or arrests involving reasonable suspicion and required verification with the federal government under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c).
State level: A.R.S. § 13-1509 created an Arizona offense for willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document in violation of federal registration requirements referenced in the statute.
State level: A.R.S. § 13-2928(C) made it unlawful for an unauthorized alien unlawfully present in the United States to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work in Arizona.
State level: A.R.S. § 13-3883(A)(5) permitted warrantless arrest when the officer had probable cause to believe the person committed a public offense that makes the person removable from the United States.
National overview: In a March 26, 2012 amicus brief in No. 11-182, the ABA argued that the four enjoined provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 were preempted.

Last reviewed: May 2026. Legal rules, forms, deadlines, and procedures can change by jurisdiction, agency, and court system.

Contents

What this archive record was about in 2012
The Supreme Court case and the amicus timing
What the Supreme Court held about SB 1070 provisions
How the four enjoined provisions were built into Arizona law
Where federal immigration law entered through verification and registration
What the ABA argued in its March 26, 2012 amicus brief
Why preemption disputes like this one mattered to the federal state balance
A historical note on the enacted Arizona statute text
Current relevance readers generally look for in this archive record
Sources

What this archive record was about in 2012

The historical focus of this archived item was an ABA amicus filing in Arizona v. United States (No. 11-182), where the question included whether parts of Arizona’s SB 1070 conflicted with federal immigration law.

The Supreme Court case used a procedural and substantive mix: a federal lawsuit sought to stop Arizona’s enforcement of certain SB 1070 provisions, and the Court addressed preemption and the limits of pre-enforcement injunctions. The ABA brief represented one side of that dispute during Supreme Court review.

The Supreme Court case and the amicus timing

Arizona v. United States came before the U.S. Supreme Court as No. 11-182, and the Court’s docket lists the American Bar Association as having filed an amici curiae brief on March 26, 2012 (Supreme Court docket for 11-182).

The published syllabus for the opinion describes that an Arizona statute known as S.B. 1070 was enacted in 2010, that the United States sought to enjoin the law as preempted, and that a preliminary injunction blocked four provisions from taking effect (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion).

What the Supreme Court held about SB 1070 provisions

In the controlling Supreme Court decision discussed in the syllabus, the Court treated three SB 1070 provisions as preempted by federal law and addressed a fourth provision in a more limited way.

The syllabus states two core outcomes:

Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 of S.B. 1070 are preempted by federal law (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion).
It was improper to enjoin S.B. 1070 Section 2(B) before state courts had an opportunity to construe it, and without some showing that enforcement in fact conflicted with federal immigration law and its objectives (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion).

How the four enjoined provisions were built into Arizona law

SB 1070’s challenge is easiest to understand when described as four categories: (1) status checks and verification, (2) criminal liability tied to an alien registration document requirement, (3) work-related restrictions tied to unauthorized status, and (4) a warrantless arrest framework.

Below is a compact mapping between the SB 1070 provisions described in this record and the corresponding Arizona codified provisions reflected in the Arizona Legislative Council pages used for this archive recovery.

SB 1070 provision (challenged category)	Arizona codified provision used here	High-level description from the state text
Section 2(B) (verification in certain encounters)	A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) cooperation and verification	For certain lawful stops, detentions, or arrests involving reasonable suspicion of an alien unlawfully present, officers make a reasonable attempt to determine immigration status and verify it with the federal government under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) response to verification inquiries.
Section 3 (alien registration document offense)	A.R.S. § 13-1509 alien registration document offense	Creates a state offense for willful failure to complete or carry an alien registration document when federal registration requirements referenced in the statute are violated.
Section 5(C) (work-related prohibition)	A.R.S. § 13-2928 work prohibition	Makes it unlawful for an unauthorized alien unlawfully present to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work in Arizona.
Section 6 (warrantless arrest authority)	A.R.S. § 13-3883 warrantless arrest authority	Allows warrantless arrest when the officer has probable cause to believe the person committed a public offense that makes the person removable from the United States.

Where federal immigration law entered through verification and registration

Even though the challenged provisions were Arizona statutes, they relied on federal immigration systems through statutory cross-references.

For example, Arizona’s verification approach in A.R.S. § 11-1051(B) cooperation and verification required verification with the federal government under 8 U.S.C. § 1373(c) response to verification inquiries, including a statutory obligation to respond to inquiries seeking verification or status information.

That structure helped frame the preemption dispute: the state provisions were not treated as independent from federal immigration systems, because key operational elements turned on federal verification and registration requirements.

What the ABA argued in its March 26, 2012 amicus brief

This archive item highlighted the ABA’s position as it appeared in the Supreme Court record.

The ABA brief itself is dated March 26, 2012 and is labeled as a brief of the American Bar Association as amicus curiae in support of the respondent (ABA amicus brief filed March 26, 2012). The Supreme Court docket also reflects that filing date (Supreme Court docket for 11-182).

In that brief, the ABA urged the Court to hold that “the four enjoined provisions of Arizona’s S.B. 1070 are preempted” (ABA amicus brief filed March 26, 2012).

For additional archival context on ABA leadership engagement with Supreme Court decisions, see American Bar Association president’s Supreme Court statement.

Why preemption disputes like this one mattered to the federal state balance

Preemption disputes in immigration cases often focus on whether a state measure operates like an additional immigration regime or instead conflicts with federal control of immigration and removal.

In this archive record, the Court’s syllabus provides the controlling takeaway: the Court concluded that federal law preempted specific SB 1070 provisions (Sections 3, 5(C), and 6) (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion). The Court also concluded that the preliminary injunction against Section 2(B) should not have issued before state courts construed the provision and a conflict with federal immigration law and objectives had been shown (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion).

This separation helps explain why historical summaries could treat “the four enjoined provisions” as a single package, even though the Court handled one provision differently at the injunction stage.

A historical note on the enacted Arizona statute text

SB 1070’s legislative history matters when reading archive coverage.

The enrolled bill materials describe that on April 23, 2010, Senate Bill 1070 was signed into law and enacted as Laws 2010, Chapter 113, with additional changes made by HB 2162 (Enrolled SB 1070 as enacted with HB 2162). That context places the dispute in a 2010 enactment that reached the Supreme Court in 2012 through a federal challenge.

Current relevance readers generally look for in this archive record

This 2012 dispute remains relevant for modern legal reading because the Supreme Court’s decision set binding limits for how federal law displaced (preempted) certain SB 1070 provisions and for how courts handle pre-enforcement injunctions when state-law meaning has not yet been construed.

The syllabus directly states those outcomes for Sections 3, 5(C), and 6 preemption and for the injunction timing issue involving Section 2(B) (Arizona v. United States syllabus and slip opinion).

As with any archive recovery item, the historical record here does not verify any post-2012 amendments, repeals, or other changes to Arizona’s codified provisions beyond the materials relied upon for the case discussion. For that reason, modern readers typically treat the Supreme Court holding as the stable legal point of reference, rather than treating later codification updates as automatically controlling.